Good essay conclusion Syrian Problem The problems in Syria began in as a peaceful protest but quickly rose into an armed civil conflict which has cost the lives ofpeople and forced over two million to flee to the relative safety of neighboring countries. Unarmed civilians were attacked and killed by government troops as they searched for the most effective and seemingly brutal method for quelling this uprising. Now there are some US politicians, who feel that it is the duty of our country to get involved militarily, but this with two wars already fought the past ten years, there seems to be little to no public support for this type of move. The punishments were seen as unjust and many took to the streets in protest.
World Development Indicators, World Bank The wager within the regime, from until the end ofhas been this: The longer you stay in the same place or continue to hold on to particular positions — provided that the "place" or "position" is well-deliberated and domestic power relations remain constant — the more likely that a balance can be struck to accommodate the regime, locally, regionally and internationally.
In other words, "Stay standing until the others fall," while maintaining a functioning, even if inefficient, economic and administrative apparatus, and continuing to provide the most basic social services. This strategy partly relied on the follies and adventurism of other players, including the United States, Israel the so-called "moderate" Arab regimes and the Lebanese political chiefs.
Syria might not progress rapidly, but its adherence to stability might pay off as other players stumble.
The strategy requires that the domestic arena be fully under the regime's control, so much so that even the law of unintended consequences must be reined in by risk-averse economic and political decisions that would otherwise seem irrational. In large measure, this explains the brutal response to the protests of spring Hence, economic reform proceeds in a manner The history of syrias economy essay strikes a balance between the expansion of economic opportunities, on the one hand, and the maintenance of monopolies by loyal political and economic elites, on the other.
But this strategy has been failing in the face of a rapidly growing population, declining oil rents and increasingly scarce water resources. Even if the Syrian regime weathers the current domestic challenge to its rule, it needs a new approach to socioeconomic management if it hopes to maintain stability henceforth.
Looking forward, there is some movement disturbing the equilibrium, albeit in unpredictable ways: Note that these doors were opened only slightly, and mainly because of the renewed capacity of regime loyalists to capture the majority of the gains.
Gradually, this strategy will produce its own unintended consequences that could well spin out of the regime's control. The manner in which the current "economic opening" has proceeded resembles in form, but not in content, processes under Hafez al-Asad. Whereas the route to broadening the regime's base was through strategically based economic networks comprising top segments of the political and economic elitewe are now witnessing more organic forms of solidarity.
First, these networks are maturing, and their ties to regime strongmen are deepening. More important, solidarity-based economic networks are emerging whose ties to the regime are based on a far more genuine belief in its legitimacy, specifically, its younger leadership.
This is not simply a matter of superficial alliances; two factors undergird this transformation from strategic to solidarity networks. First, by the end ofa cross section of the Syrian population with the wider Arab population has come to see Bashar's rule in far more favorable terms than they perceived that of his father.
More consequential are the new social formations new groups or "classes" that have emerged as a social and generational product of economic expansion since This aggressive and self-aware social stratum is key to understanding the medium- to long-term development of Syria's political economy.
Until then, one must not expect much to change beyond the patterns and constraints discussed above.
The development that analysts and policy makers should watch in order to know the fate of this new social formation is the increasing polarization of Syrian society, namely the gap between the few winners and the many losers.
Economic-policy recommendations are tricky in Syria, as in many developing countries, largely because the heart of the problem is political. One must take into account three key factors: Furthermore, analysts often adopt the normative standards of neoliberal economic principles as though they are a panacea, ignoring the politically restrictive domestic, regional and international contexts in which the Syrian economy and any attempted reforms are firmly embedded.
Other observers focus exclusively on authoritarian practices as the principal stumbling block, assuming that "democracy" is a solution to all developmental hardships. Finally, critics from the left often focus exclusively on social justice, as if it were simply a matter of ideology and moral principle.
Complicating matters further is the stale assumption of trickle-down economics, still embraced by powerful institutions, states and elites, domestically as well as internationally. This point of view, albeit now falling out of favor, de-prioritizes the needs of the largest segments of society in favor of economic policies that promise plenty from capital concentration.
In the context of late-developing countries, in particular, trickle-down claims are giving way to more equity-conscious development economics. In recommending any policy orientation, one must take into account a crucial piece of the puzzle: No set of recommendations will be implementable if insufficient attention is paid to these issues, both of which are matters of political will but require administrative competence to be seen through to completion.Throughout history, Greater Syria has been the focal point of a continual dialectic, both intellectual and bellicose, between the Middle East and the West.
Today, Syria remains an active participant in the trials and tribulations of a troubled and volatile region. Censorship is enforced strictly, and foreign books about politics and contemporary Syrian or Middle Eastern history are banned.
The National Film Centre, established in , oversees the production of . The History Of Syria’s Economy Essay Sample. Introduction. Syria was previously known as Syrian Arab economy and its capital city Damascus. It is located on the eastern part of the Mediterranean Sea with turkey to the north, Iraq to the east, Jordan to the south and Israel and Lebanon to the west.
There are also Syrian Jews who settled mostly in New York in and there are about 50, Syrian Jews who live in the United States (Meyers, ).
The Americans observe holidays that are derived from the history of the United States, national patriarchs, and religious traditions. Learn more about the Syria economy, including the population of Syria, GDP, facts, trade, business, inflation and other data and analysis on its economy from the Index of Economic Freedom.
The Effect Of Refugees On The Lebanese Economy Economics Essay; Print Download Reference This Reddit This. Tweet. The Effect Of Refugees On The Lebanese Economy Economics Essay.
Research Proposal: The Effect of Refugees on the Lebanese Economy. When the uprising started in Syria in March last year, the Syrian economy was still.